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Human choice behavior often reflects a competition
between inflexible computationally efficient control
on the one hand and a slower more flexible system
of control on the other. This distinction is well
captured by model-free and model-based reinforce-
ment learning algorithms. Here, studying human sub-
jects, we show it is possible to shift the balance of
control between these systems by disruption of right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, such that participants
manifest a dominance of the less optimal model-free
control. In contrast, disruption of left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex impaired model-based perfor-
mance only in those participants with low working
memory capacity.
INTRODUCTION
Why is our behavior at times automatic and driven by habit and at
other times deliberative and focused on a specific goal?
Although most of us seamlessly switch between these modes
of behavior, it has been suggested that a relative dominance of
either habit-like or goal-directed modes of behavior underpin a
range of disorders that span addictions (Everitt and Robbins,
2005) through to Parkinson’s disease (de Wit et al., 2011). This
renders understanding the parsing of control between these
two modes of decision making a pressing issue. Here we
address whether it is possible to causally manipulate their
relative dominance.
An elegant computational framework that captures the pres-
ence of (often competing) habit-like and goal-directed behaviors
is provided by a formulation of model-free and model-based
control (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan and Niv, 2008). A model-free
system learns a single value for each action based on reward
prediction errors and guides behavior based on these alone,
thus trading a minimum of computational effort against the
cost of a relative lack of flexibility in adjusting to current goals.
Model-based control, by contrast, dynamically computes
optimal actions by forward planning, a process that is computa-914 Neuron 80, 914–919, November 20, 2013 ª2013 The Authorstionally demanding but allows for flexible, outcome-specific
behavioral repertoires (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan and Niv, 2008;
Otto et al., 2013; but see Gershman et al., 2012).
In this study, our goal was to manipulate the relative balance
between these two systems in human participants. We focused
on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) as a substrate for
model-based processes based on previous evidence for its
role in the construction and use of associative models (Gla¨scher
et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012a; Xue et al., 2012) and the
coding of hypothetical outcomes (Abe and Lee, 2011). Work on
nonhuman primates also implicates the dlPFC as a site for
convergence of reward and contextual information (Lee and
Seo, 2007), while lesions of rat prelimbic region (which some
argue is equivalent to primate dlPFC [Fuster, 2008; but see
Preuss, 1995; Uylings et al., 2003]) abolishes flexible decision
making (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003).
Therefore, while the literature suggests a crucial role for this
region in model-based control to date there is a lack of causal
evidence to support this hypothesis. Here we used a transient
lesion model, as engendered by theta burst transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TBS), to provide evidence for a necessary
role of dlPFC in model-based behavior.
RESULTS
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Task
We recruited 25 human participants (mean age [SD]: 24.2 [4.0]
years; 15 females) to perform a task in which behavior can be ex-
plained by a mixture of model-free and model-based control
(Daw et al., 2011). All participants were tested on three separate
sessions (3 to 16 days apart) after MRI-guided TBS to the right
dlPFC, left dlPFC, or vertex. TBS is known to inhibit cortical
excitability for at least 20 min (Huang et al., 2005). We thus
predicted that participants would show reduced model-based
control after dlPFC compared to vertex TBS. Given existing
evidence of functional asymmetries between left and right
dlPFC, e.g., in reciprocal fairness (Knoch et al., 2006) and work-
ing memory (Mull and Seyal, 2001), we also hypothesized that
the effects of TBS would differ between these sites.
We used a task that enables quantification of model-based
and model-free control over choices (Daw et al., 2011). Partici-
pants were required to make two choices on every trial to arrive
Figure 1. Task Design
(A) On each trial, a choice between two stimuli led probabilistically to one of
two further pairs of stimuli, which then demanded another choice followed by
reward or no reward according to the p(reward) of the chosen second-stage
stimulus that fluctuated over time. Importantly, participants could learn that
each first-stage stimulus led more often (70%/30%) to one of the pairs; this
task structure could then be exploited by a model-based, but not by a model-
free, controller.
(B) Model-based and model-free strategies for reinforcement learning predict
differences in feedback processing particularly after uncommon transitions. If
choices were exclusively model-free, then a reward would increase the like-
lihood of staying with the same stimulus on the next trial, regardless of the type
of transition (left). Alternatively, if choices were driven by a model-based
system, the impact of reward would interact with the transition type (middle).
As shown previously, behavior in healthy participants resembles a hybrid of
model-based and model-free control (right; Daw et al., 2011; Otto et al., 2013;
Wunderlich et al., 2012b). We can thus quantify model-free control by esti-
mating the main effect of reward, and model-based control by estimating the
reward-by-transition interaction. Please see Figure S1 for a validation of the
random walks.
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at the first stage of the task probabilistically determine which
pair of options becomes available to the participant at the
second stage. Crucially, for each first-stage action, one pair
of second-stage options is more likely to occur (a ‘‘common
transition’’). Because a model-based controller is able to incor-
porate the probability of state-state transitions into its decision
making, while the model-free controller is not, the predictions
made by these controllers diverge after uncommon transitions,
while being identical after common ones (Figure 1B). For
example, a reward obtained after an uncommon transition
prompts a model-free agent to (erroneously) choose the very
same first-stage stimulus on the next trial, since action values
are updated based solely on the reward that follows the action.In contrast, a model-based agent who can represent task
structure would, upon receiving a reward after an uncommon
transition, be more likely to switch to the previously unchosen
first-stage stimulus, since this behavior is more likely to lead to
the just-rewarded second-stage pair. Using these divergent
predictions about first-stage choice behavior, we can infer
the influence of the controllers in terms of the main effect of
reward (model-free) and the interaction between reward and
transition likelihood (model-based) on the probability of staying
with the same first-stage stimulus (as in Daw et al., 2011). We
refer to Figure S1 available online for a validation of this
approach and Figure S2A for an analysis of second-stage
choices.
Participants’ first-stage choices for all three TBS conditions
qualitatively reflected a hybrid of model-based and model-
free control (Figure 2A; cf. Figure 1B). We estimated the main
effect of reward and the reward-by-transition interaction for
each TBS site using hierarchical logistic regression, with all
coefficients taken as random effects across participants (see
Experimental Procedures for details). We observed positive
coefficients for the reward and reward-by-transition regressors
for all three TBS sites (all p < 0.006), confirming that behavior
comprised a hybrid of model-free and model-based control
(see Figure S2B). Levels of model-based and model-free con-
trol after left and right dlPFC TBS were then contrasted with
vertex (Figure 2B). We observed that TBS to neither left (p =
0.52) nor right (p = 0.20) dlPFC significantly changed model-
free control compared to vertex. By contrast, model-based
control was disrupted following TBS to right (p = 0.01) but not
left (p = 0.89) dlPFC compared to vertex. We observed no
difference in model-based control between left and right dlPFC
(p = 0.13).
We also computed a measure of the relative balance between
these two systems as bmodel-based  bmodel-free (Figure 2C). This
showed a significant shift toward model-free control caused by
TBS to right (p = 0.01) but not left (p = 0.63) dlPFC compared
to vertex. We observed no difference between left and right
dlPFC (p = 0.11). Together, these results provide evidence that
right dlPFC exerts a causal role in model-based control and
show that the balance between model-based and model-free
control can be manipulated through prefrontal disruption
via TBS.
We repeated these analyses to examine order effects. In pair-
wise session comparisons, we found no effect of session on
model-free or model-based control or on the balance between
model-based and model-free control (all p > 0.14), except for a
marginally significant increase in model-free control in session
3 compared to session 1 (p = 0.04).
Model-based control is thought to depend on a number of pro-
cesses including prefrontal working memory (WM) capacity.
Given that studies of WM report lateralized functionality (e.g.,
Mull and Seyal, 2001), we asked whether the magnitude of a
TBS effect might be related to WM capacity. To examine such
interindividual differences, we could not use the population
parameter estimates obtained through the regression. Instead,
we extracted the numerical magnitude of the main effect of
reward, the reward-by-transition interaction, and the difference
between the two from each subject’s average stay probabilityNeuron 80, 914–919, November 20, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 915
Figure 2. Results
(A) The probability of repeating the same first-stage choice is shown as a
function of reward and transition experienced on the previous trial. The pattern
of choices qualitatively resembles influences of bothmodel-based andmodel-
free control for all three stimulation sites (cf. Figure 1B, right).
(B) We quantified model-free and model-based control as the main effect of
reward and the reward-by-transition interaction, respectively, in a hierarchical
logistic regression on stay/switch behavior on each trial. Disruption of right
dlPFC reduced model-based control compared to vertex. TBS did not
significantly affect model-free control.
(C) The relative balance between the controllers was calculated as
bmodel-based – bmodel-free. The balance significantly shifted toward model-free
control after disruption of right, but not left, dlPFC compared to vertex. Error
bars indicate SEM. Please see Figure S2 for additional stay-switch analyses.
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tion condition.
We first asked whether model-free or model-based control
independently correlated with WM in any of the three stimulation
conditions. Only the magnitude of the reward-by-transition inter-
action, inferred as model-based control, correlated with WM
after disruption to left dlPFC (r = 0.45, p = 0.02; all other p >
0.10). We then correlated the balance between the two systems
in all stimulation conditions with WM. Strikingly, only behavior
after disruption of left dlPFC was WM dependent (Figure 3;
vertex, r = 0.09, p = 0.68; left dlPFC r = 0.53, p = 0.006; right
dlPFC, r = 0.05, p = 0.80). Pairwise permutation tests revealed916 Neuron 80, 914–919, November 20, 2013 ª2013 The Authorsthat the correlation was significantly more positive in left
compared to right dlPFC (105 permutations, p = 0.009), margin-
ally more positive in left dlPFC compared to vertex (p = 0.06), and
not significantly different between right dlPFC and vertex (p =
0.52). Taken together, these data show that the effect of left
dlPFC disruption on the balance between model-based and
model-free control depends on WM capacity, with high WM
participants retaining more model-based control compared to
those with low WM.
DISCUSSION
The balance between model-based and model-free control is
often framed as a competition between a flexible, forward-look-
ing system and a simpler retrospective stimulus-response-
based system (Daw et al., 2005). Our results show that the
balance between these two systems can be causally manipu-
lated in the human brain by a disruption to prefrontal cortex.
Our data suggest that TBS to right dlPFC impairs a key node in
a network that underpins model-based control (cf. Gla¨scher
et al., 2010; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003). We further show
an involvement of left dlPFC in model-based control that is
related to individual differences in working memory, suggesting
differential roles for left and right dlPFC in the functional architec-
ture underlying deliberative choice.
Animal lesion and human imaging work suggest that sectors of
prefrontal cortex are involved in high-level cognition and deci-
sionmaking (Miller and Cohen, 2001). These studies have shown
correlates of model-based control in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex and dlPFC as well as outside the prefrontal cortex, e.g.,
dorsomedial striatum (Boorman et al., 2009; de Wit et al.,
2009; Gallagher et al., 1999; Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Hikosaka,
2007; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Liljeholm and O’Doherty,
2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012a; Xue et al., 2012). In contrast,
model-free control is most strongly associated with the dorsolat-
eral striatum and infralimbic cortex (Balleine and O’Doherty,
2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012a; Yin et al., 2004). Furthermore, a
strong dependence of model-based control on prefrontal sys-
tems is hinted by a finding that its dominance can be abolished
during dual-task performance (Otto et al., 2013). However, up to
now the key human evidence for dlPFC involvement in model-
based control has been based on correlational evidence using
functional imaging (fMRI). Here we show that model-based
control is impaired by a transient disruption of the right dlPFC,
providing causal evidence for its involvement in complex, flex-
ible, decision making. We note that this effect was significant
only when compared to the vertex, our control site, but not
when compared to left dlPFC. We speculate that this might be
due to individual variation in the role of the left dlPFC in model-
based control or in the strategies employed by our participants
to solve the task.
An influential hypothesis about the balance between model-
based and model-free control states that their individual influ-
ence over behavior is governed by their respective uncertainties
(Daw et al., 2005).Within this framework, our results can be inter-
preted as emerging out of a disruption to a key component pro-
cess of model-based control (e.g., the utilization of associative
models; Gla¨scher et al., 2010). This would lessen the certainties
Figure 3. Working Memory Capacity Inter-
acts with Stimulation in Left dlPFC
Workingmemory (WM) capacity did not predict the
balance between model-based and model-free
control after disruption of vertex (left) or right
dlPFC (right). In contrast, higher WM was associ-
ated with relatively stronger model-based control
after disruption of left dlPFC (middle) with the
correlation being significantly more positive than
for right dlPFC (permutation test, p = 0.009) or
vertex (p = 0.06).
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over behavior—similar to that observed when subjects are
distracted by a dual task (Otto et al., 2013). However, whereas
disruption of right dlPFC led to an unambiguous impairment of
model-based control, the effect of TBS on the left dlPFC was
dependent on baseline WM capacity. Specifically, higher WM
capacity conferred a degree of protection against a shift toward
model-free control upon disruption of left dlPFC, whereas partic-
ipants with low WM capacity appear to require an uncompro-
mised left dlPFC for the exercise of model-based control. We
acknowledge uncertainty as to what precise factors might
explain this finding.
We note that TBS to left, but not right, dlPFC has been re-
ported to decrease dopamine levels across the basal ganglia
(Ko et al., 2008). This effect might interact with baseline dopa-
mine levels that are known to covary with WM capacity (Cools
et al., 2008), such that high WM participants are more resilient
against TBS-induced decreases in dopamine than low WM
participants. We previously showed that dopamine levels modu-
late the balance between model-based and model-free control
(de Wit et al., 2011, 2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012b), and a
TBS-induced depletion in low WM (i.e., low dopamine) individ-
uals might have a more pronounced effect than a similar deple-
tion in high WM (i.e., high dopamine) individuals. However, given
that we did not directly measure dopamine levels, future work
could usefully explore potential interactions between WM and
model-based control to fully understand the effect reported here.
Our findings speak to the literature on goal-directed and
habitual behaviors (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). Although
model-based/model-free and goal-directed/habitual control
are not synonymous, the former provides a computational
framework that can encompass key features of goal-directed
and habitual control (for a review, see Dayan and Niv, 2008).
We would predict that a disruption of right dlPFC would also
impair goal-directed behavior in devaluation and contingency
degradation tests in humans, as has been shown in rats (Balleine
and O’Doherty, 2010).
In summary, we provide causal evidence for a role of the right
dlPFC in flexible, model-based decision making. Our findings
invite the question as to whether naturally occurring variation in
dlPFC function and connectivity is a marker for predisposition
toward model-free as opposed to model-based control and
whether an enhancement of dlPFC function (e.g., through other
stimulation protocols) might improve rather than impair model-
based control.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Twenty-five adults participated in the experiment (15 females; age range
18–35 years; mean = 24.2, SD = 4.0 years). All participants had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision and were without a history of psychiatric or neurolog-
ical disorder. All participants providedwritten informed consent prior to start of
the experiment, which was approved by the Research Ethics Committee at
University College London (UK). No participants were excluded over the
course of the experiment.
General Design
Participants were tested on 3 days between 3 and 16 days (mean = 5.9,
SD = 2.6) apart. In each session, participants practiced 50 trials of the task
before receiving offline theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TBS;
Huang et al., 2005) to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), left
dlPFC, or vertex. Participants then performed 201 trials on the task.
Task
The task design was based on Daw et al. (2011) and identical to Wunderlich
et al. (2012b) except for faster trial timings to fit the task within a constraint
of 20 min, i.e., the estimated time during which TBS modulates local neuronal
excitability (Huang et al., 2005). The task was programmed in Cogent 2000 &
Graphics (John Romaya, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging and
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience development team, UCL) in MATLAB
(MathWorks).
Each trial consisted of two choice stages. Each choice stage contained a
two-alternative forced choice, with choice options represented by a fractal
in a colored box on a black background (Figure 1A). On each choice, partici-
pants had to respond within 2 s using the left/right cursor keys or the trial
was aborted and reward omitted. Missed trials (mean = 0.1%, range = 0%–
1.5%) were omitted from analysis.
Choice at the first stage always involved the same two stimuli. After partic-
ipantsmade their response, the rejected stimulus disappeared from the screen
and the chosen stimulus moved to the top of the screen. After 0.5 s, one of two
second-stage stimulus pairs appeared, with the transition from first to second
stage following fixed transition probabilities. Each first-stage option was more
strongly (with a 70% transition probability) associated with one of the two sec-
ond-stage pairs, a crucial factor in allowing us to distinguish model-free from
model-based behavior (see below). In both stages, the two choice options
were randomly assigned to the left and right side of the screen, forcing the par-
ticipants to use a stimulus- rather than action-based learning strategy. After
the second choice, the chosen option remained on the screen, together with
a reward symbol (a pound coin) or a ‘‘no reward’’ symbol (a red cross). Each
of the four stimuli in stage two had a reward probability between 0.2 and
0.8. These reward probabilities drifted slowly and independently for each of
the four second-stage options through a diffusion process with Gaussian noise
(mean 0, SD 0.025) on each trial. Three random walks were generated before-
hand and randomly assigned to sessions. We chose to preselect random
walks as otherwise they might, by chance, turn out to have relatively static
optimal strategies (e.g., when a single second-stage stimulus remains at or
close to p(reward) = 0.8). Such static optimal strategies can lead to theNeuron 80, 914–919, November 20, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 917
Table 1. Regressors for Hierarchical Logistic Regression
Intercept
Left dlPFC
Right dlPFC
Left dlPFC 3 reward
Right dlPFC 3 reward
Vertex 3 reward
Left dlPFC 3 transition
Right dlPFC 3 transition
Vertex 3 transition
Left dlPFC 3 reward 3 transition
Right dlPFC 3 reward 3 transition
Vertex 3 reward 3 transition
Regressors for hierarchical logistic regression on stay (coded as 1) or
switch (coded as 0) for each first-stage choice. The main effect of vertex
is subsumed in the intercept.
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agent due to the nature of the 1-back regression analysis (also see Figure S1
for a validation of our random walks).
Prior to the experiment, participants were explicitly instructed that for each
stimulus in the first stage, one of the two transition probabilities was higher
than the other and that these transition probabilities remained constant
throughout the experiment. Participants were also told that reward probabili-
ties on the second stage would change slowly, randomly, and independently
over time. On all 3 days, participants practiced 50 trials with different stimuli
before starting the task. The main task consisted of 201 trials with 20 s breaks
after trial 67 and 134. The participant’s payment was determined as a flat rate
plus their overall accumulated reward from both sessions. Reward per session
ranged from 3.75–12.75 in £s (mean = 8.4, SD = 2.4; no difference between
sessions [F(2,48) = 1.51, p = 0.23] or TBS sites [F(2,48) = 1.23, p = 0.30] in
three-way ANOVA).
Baseline Working Memory Capacity
In the first session, before any TBS or practice on the main task, participants
performed a 7 min task to establish visuospatial working memory capacity.
In short, participants had to remember the location of five simultaneously pre-
sented dots in a circular array of 16 positions. After a delay, the participant was
asked whether, for one of the 16 locations, a red dot was presented. From
these data, we calculated a K value, reflecting the amount of information
that the participant can store in working memory. For details of the task and
analysis, see McNab and Klingberg (2008).
Theta Burst Stimulation
Participants received TBS over the right dlPFC, left dlPFC, and vertex on three
separate occasions, with site order counterbalanced across 24 participants,
and the 25th participant received a randomly selected session order. We iden-
tified stimulation sites as follows: the MNI coordinates for the right dlPFC
(x = 37, y = 36, z = 34) were taken from a previous study that used a combina-
tion of individual anatomy and fMRI results to pinpoint the dlPFC (Feredoes
et al., 2011). For the left dlPFC (x = 37, y = 36, z = 34), we took the negative
of the right dlPFC x-coordinate. These MNI coordinates were transformed to
coordinates in native space by taking the inverse normalization parameters
from unified segmentation of a previously acquired T1w structural image as
implemented in SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, UK).
We visually confirmed that the coordinates in native space corresponded to
middle frontal gyrus (as in Feredoes et al., 2011). These coordinates were
then entered as targets into Visor2 (ANT B.V.), which uses a 3D camera to
guide the stimulation coil (Magstim) to the target coordinate. The vertex was
set to the Cz of the 10-20 system. To mimic the stimulation experience for
the participant, we entered the vertex coordinates into Visor2 and used 3D
navigation to target the stimulation coil.918 Neuron 80, 914–919, November 20, 2013 ª2013 The AuthorsWe administered stimulation in 5 Hz bursts of three pulses set 20 ms apart,
for 40 s, amounting to a total of 600 pulses. Stimulation intensity was set for
each individual participant as 90% of active motor threshold (AMT). AMT
was defined as the lowest stimulation intensity, expressed as a percentage
of max output of the Magstim equipment that reliably (3/5 times) yielded a
visible muscle twitch in the hand when stimulating the hand area of the contra-
lateral motor cortex with a single pulse. During this procedure, participants
held (lightly) an item in the hand contralateral to the stimulation site. For tech-
nical and safety reasons, the maximum stimulation intensity was set to 51% of
maximum output; as such, any participant with an AMT > 56% received TBS at
51% of maximum output. Note that such reduced stimulation will make it less
likely to find significant effects of TBS. The average stimulation intensity was
49% (range: 40%–51%) of maximum output.
Analysis
We analyzed stay-switch behavior on the first choice of each trial to dissociate
model-based and model-free control. A model-free reinforcement learning
strategy predicts a main effect of reward on stay probability. This is because
model-free choice works without considering structure in the environment;
hence, rewarded choices are more likely to be repeated, regardless of whether
that reward followed a common or rare transition (Figure 1B, left). A reward
after an uncommon transition would therefore adversely increase the value
of the chosen first stage cue without updating the value of the unchosen
cue. In contrast, under a model-based strategy, we expect an interaction
between transition and reward on the previous trial, because a rare transition
inverts the effect of a subsequent outcome (Figure 1B, middle). Under model-
based control, receiving a reward after an uncommon transition increases the
propensity to switch. This is because the rewarded second-stage stimulus can
be more reliably accessed by choosing the rejected first-stage cue than by
choosing the same cue again. To summarize, this analysis quantifies model-
free behavior as the strength of the main effect of reward and model-based
behavior as the strength of the reward by transition interaction, even when
actual behavior is a hybrid of model-free and model-based control (Figure 1B,
right).
We used hierarchical logistic regression implemented in lme4 (Bates et al.,
2012) in the R software package (R Development Core Team, 2011). We
estimated coefficients for the regressors shown in Table 1, taking all coeffi-
cients as random effects over participants. This method accounts for both
within- and between-subject variance, providing unbiased estimates of the
population coefficient for each regressor. We then performed contrasts over
the population coefficients to test for differences between conditions in
model-free and model-based control. All p values reported in the manuscript
that pertain to the logistic regression are based on the chi-square distribution
and were estimated using the ‘‘esticon’’ procedure in the ‘‘doBy’’ package
(Højsgaard, 2006).
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